11. Defence and security

brexit-fact-base-london — Photo by Peter R Foster IDMA/Shutterstock

With rising global threat levels, defence spending has been increasing around the world. In 2024:
- top five military spenders are the US, China, Russia, Germany and India
- UK in sixth place, just above France
- EU accounted for 14% of total
- NATO members accounted for 55%
All NATO members were expected to hit the old 2% GDP target in 2025 (for the first time since 2014), as was the overall spend of EU member states
- some NATO members such as Poland and the Baltic states spend considerably more
Defence and security threats facing UK and the EU require cross-border cooperation, such as:
- Russia’s military threat and systemic rivalry with China
- hybrid, cyber, terrorist attacks
- economic, climate-driven risks
- pandemics
Russian invasion of Ukraine has stimulated change in the EU
- defence decisions and funding allocations remain a national competence
- significant increase in funding through European Defence Fund and cheap borrowing (SAFE)
- ~75 collaborative projects under PESCO
Brexit makes it difficult UK and EU to work together:
- removed formal UK influence over EU policy for defence and security
- foreign and defence policy cooperation does not form part of the TCA
- trade barriers from leaving Customs Union and Single Market impede collaboration on military production and make it more costly
UK-EU cooperation is constrained and based on looser ad hoc arrangements, bilateral agreements and projects. Examples include:
- UK as member of the E5
- Joint Expeditionary Force, which the UK leads
- a new Security and Defence Partnersip
Security
- EU and UK continue to share DNA and fingerprint data through Prüm, and to transfer Passenger Name Record data.
- UK has lost access to EU databases – notably SIS
- UK cooperates with Europol and Eurojust, including data-sharing.