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Introduction
Critics often accuse the EU of having a democratic deficit. A deficit arises when decisions which affect people lack sufficient public participation or accountability. Most democratic systems have a democratic deficit, but the size of a deficit and its causes vary. For example, there may be a real deficit caused by weak democratic accountability, or an apparent deficit exaggerated by misinformation to serve a political agenda. Either case is likely to influence voter perceptions and their engagement with the political process.
To asses the extent of a democratic deficit in the EU, this section discusses citizen attitudes to the EU and factors that may cause a deficit such as voting systems, the EU’s legislative process and misinformation. It concludes with the key health-check: the trend in voter engagement in EU elections.
General sources:
The Lure of Greatness, Anthony Barnett, 2017
The Great Deception, Christopher Booker and Richard North, 2016 (third edition)
Citizen attitudes to the EU
EU citizens value the EU’s benefits. In March 2025, 74% of EU citizens say that membership had benefited their country according to the Eurobarometer survey, commissioned by the European Parliament and conducted in January and February. This was the highest result since the survey began in 1983.
They also have a strong belief in the value of collective action. Nine in ten (89%) EU citizens say that EU Member States should act more united to face current global challenges. In addition, 66% of EU citizens want the EU to play a greater role in protecting them against global crises and security risks.
Further, the people’s tendency to trust the EU reached an 18-year high of 52%, greater than the tendency to trust a national parliament (37%) or government (36%) (Figure 1.6).
Figure 1.6: How much trust do you have in certain institutions?
Non-EU citizens also have a favourable view of the EU. The Eurobarometer results are consistent with the most recent Pew Research Center survey of 25 countries, nine EU members and 16 non-members, published in September 2025 (see Figure 1.7).
The survey was conducted in the spring and found 62% of respondents have largely favourable views of the EU, with 32% having an unfavourable view. Interestingly, the UK’s favourable view is also 62% with unfavourable at 35%.
Other national variations showed Germany and the US with favourable views of 71% and 60%. Greece and Turkey were the only two countries with majority unfavourable views of 60% and 49%. France has a 56% favourable view. The difference with Germany could signify that the traditional Franco-German alliance is less able politically to drive major change within the EU.
Figure 1.7: EU and non-EU citizen views of the EU
Sources:
European Parliament
Pew Research Center, September 2025
Proportional representation
The EU is a union of sovereign, democratic nations. It is an international organisation, not a state, that follows democratic principles. To join the EU, a country must be a democracy.
Citizens elect MEPs through proportional representation, which is usually seen as the most democratic way of representing the views of citizens. Only two European countries use the first-past-the-post electoral system: the UK and Belarus. For a description of the proportional voting system for the European elections, please click here.
Lisbon Treaty and QMV
Many saw the pushing through of the Lisbon Treaty as evidence that the EU and some national governments circumvent the wishes of citizens – creating democratic deficits at both levels.
The Lisbon Treaty included changes in voting to improve the speed of EU decision-making that meant that the large member states (including the UK) could be outvoted more often.
The Treaty introduced Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers for several EU competences (such as environment, agriculture and transport). Under QMV, a law passes if it is backed by at least 55% of member states (15 out of 27 countries) that make up at least 65% of the EU population. For the latter, at least 72% of member states must approve, representing the same proportion of the EU population. Abstention counts as a vote against. QMV is also used in the European Council.
On sensitive areas like defence and foreign policy, member states continue to have a veto.
The proposed treaty changes were the subject of referendums in Spain, the Netherlands and France. Spain approved but France and the Netherlands rejected. After some relatively superficial modifications including removal of references to ‘constitution’, the heads of all Member States approved the proposals in late 2007. The Irish then held two referendums on the Treaty. The first in 2008 rejected the Treaty, but the second in 2009 approved it.
In the UK, large majorities in the Commons and the Lords approved the Treaty before the Government ratified it in July 2008. There was no UK referendum.
For the UK, a key test of whether a democratic deficit existed was whether the EU then passed laws that UK citizens did not like. However QMV did not mean that the UK failed to get what it wanted. The UK was on the winning side 87% of the time between 2009-15 in the Council of Ministers, according to research by the LSE. Even where the UK was on the losing side of a vote it did not seem to cause major problems for parliament or UK citizens.
Elsewhere, weak political governance and oversight of the ECB has been a concern for several years. Some regard the EU’s failure to address it as evidence of a democratic deficit. Central bankers run the ECB technocratically and have created tensions through politically unpalatable decisions, such as punitive deficit reduction targets in Greece and in Ireland.
Source: Does the UK win or lose in the Council of Ministers?, Simon Hix and Sara Hagemann, LSE blog, 2016
Voter perceptions
The public can have a misleading impression of what the EU does. This starts with political expediency: national politicians across the EU are often guilty of blaming the EU for things for which they are responsible (e.g. national gold-plating of EU regulation). Naturally, the same politicians are quite happy to take credit for popular EU initiatives (e.g. data regulation, environmental policies, reduced credit card charges).
Voters in the EU often misunderstand the structure of the EU, the roles of its presidents and how they are appointed. The EU institutional structure is complex, but the roles are defined, and the methods of appointment are often more democratic than, say, the appointment of UK senior civil servants. The complexity, though, may look like inaccessibility to many citizens.
Before Brexit, the UK Parliament’s own interactions with the EU were not transparent to voters and parliament was not pro-active in engaging with the EU. There was certainly a lack of UK voter engagement with the EU – only one in 10 could name their MEP.
The Electoral Reform Society has suggested that parliament could have played a bigger and more visible role in holding the EU to account, by emulating the Danish approach to the EU. In Denmark, MPs question their ministers and give them a negotiating mandate before they go to European councils, whereas, UK ministers informed parliament after the event.
Voters are not alone in having a hazy understanding of the EU. The Brexit debate showed that many MPs, government ministers and journalists were surprisingly ignorant of the EU, its structure and its rules – and many still are.
Media and euromyths
Media that holds politicians to account is critical for an effective democracy. In the UK, the media did not pay as much attention to EU politicians and the Commission as they did to their UK counterparts. Its international focus tended to be directed to the US more than Europe. The media’s lack of focus on the EU contributed to low visibility for the UK public. Some described this as ‘censorship by omission’.
Even worse, the British public had been deliberately misinformed. Several UK media outlets compounded the problem by providing a steady stream of misinformation and euromyths (straight bananas etc.). The main media purveyors of euromyths were the Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph, Daily Express, the Times and the Sun, closely followed by their Sunday editions and the BBC (according to the Economist, which analysed the period 1994-2016; noting a marked increase 2010-2015 with about 30 myths a year).
This forced the Commission to set up a team in 2001 to rebut euromyths that appeared in the British media. The topics are many and varied (see Figure 1.8). Following the UK’s departure, the EU no longer maintains the list, which has been archived.
Figure 1.8: Euromyth tags
Source: Economist, Debunking years of tabloid claims about Europe, 22 June 2016
Voter interest in MEP elections
Voters have elected MEPs directly since 1979. Generally the voter turnout for MEP elections has been lower than turnout for UK domestic elections (see Figure 1.9).
- Turnout for EU elections had been on a downward trend across the EU from a high of 62.0% in 1979 to 42.6% in 2014 but recovered in 2019 and 2024 to over 50%.
- In the UK, turnout for general elections is much higher but fell sharply in 2024. For the latest national parliamentary elections, the turnout was 59.8%.
- UK turnout for EU elections was lower than the EU average but increased from 32.4% to 37.2% in 2019.
Some experienced observers feel that the election of MEPs weakened the links between national governments and the EU. Before 1979, EU business was undertaken by nominated representatives from national governments. So, the link between national and EU government was clear.
MEP elections are different to national elections. The style of electing MEPs has an in-built disconnect with EU-wide issues. Elections are not based on manifestos, unless the party has a clear single objective such as UKIP. Similarly, the political groupings in the European Parliament do not coalesce around EU-wide manifesto objectives at the time of elections.
UK MEPs tended to identify with their domestic political party allegiance but with no specific EU agenda. Unsurprisingly, voters tended to decide largely on national, not European issues.
Figure 1.9: Voter turnout (% of electorate)
