Summary
Click here to download a Pdf of this summary of Brexit FactBase (as at 21 August 2022)
A EU and sovereignty
- EU’s origins come from the aftermath of WW2 – unifying ideal: a peaceful, united and prosperous Europe
- Single Market is unique globally in creating near-frictionless trade in goods and services between member states
- Four freedoms established in 1958
- When UK joined in 1973, it was clear that membership involved much more than trade
- Member states are sovereign nations who benefit from close cooperation
- UK was sovereign throughout its EU membership
- UK had a strong influence in the EU and on EU law
- Majority of UK law determined by UK – not by EU
- EU has areas to address but democratic deficit often exaggerated
- EU uses a democratic model to govern European Commission and approve laws
- In 2014, a UK government review identified areas for EU to improve (eg democratic accountability and application of subsidiarity)
- EU has its own reform agenda including better regulation, eurozone and further reform of CAP
- UK came before ECJ less frequently than most member states
- UK was subject to EU law during the transition period
B UK contribution and benefit
- UK net contribution was about 0.4% of GDP and less than 1.2% of public expenditure in 2019
- For 2019, UK contribution was:
- £14.4 billion gross after rebate
- £7.9 billion net after public/private sector receipts
- £152 million a week (or 32p per person per day)
- Economic benefits of EU membership add an estimated 4% to GDP (IFS):
- About ten times UK’s net contribution to EU
- In 2019, GDP was £2.3 trillion and EU membership was worth:
- ~£90 billion
- ~£1,700 million a week
- ~£450 per person for the year
- UK financial settlement (what UK owes EU) was about £34 billion at 31 December 2020:
- Includes £10.1 billion contributions for 2020
- From 2021 onwards, UK will pay EU for ongoing participation in EU programmes (e.g. Horizon)
C Immigration
- Government wishes to reduce immigration, but UK’s ageing population means UK needs more migrant workers not fewer
- Policy initiatives to reduce migrant workers (e.g. increasing retirement age)Â will take years to be effective
- Freedom of Movement rules include controls over EU citizens, but UK decided not to implement them
- Net migration from non-EU countries has significantly exceeded that from EU (by four to one over the last decade)
- EU migration benefits UK economy overall
- EU27 citizens of working age are more likely working than UK or non-EU citizens
- EEA citizens in 2016-17 contributed ~£5 billion to UK public finances
- Effects of EEA migration on UK wages and employment are small
- Reduced EU migration to UK damages economy and public services
- Brexit has caused:
- Fewer EU/EEA citizens to arrive and more to leave
- Rising net migration from non-EU/EEA countries
D Trade and investment
Trade
- About 3/4 of global trade is in goods and 1/4 is in services
- EU, US and China dominate world trade
- Services trade is growing faster than goods trade
- Goods trade growth is mainly between developing nations (South–South)
- Recent trends in world trade:
- In 2020, Covid-19 caused sharp fall in global trade
- In 2021, trade in goods rebounded strongly ahead of 2019 levels but services lagged behind
- In 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine disrupted trade again
- UK ranks:
- 7th for trade after Germany, Japan and France
- 10th for goods exports
- 2nd for services exports
- Tariff and non-tariff trade barriers impede trade
- Non-tariff barriers (such as rules of origin) have much bigger impact than tariffs
- UK’s red lines limited post-Brexit deal with EU to a basic FTA
- UK-EU FTA removed tariffs but raised non-tariff barriers
- Most EU trade is with other EU27 countries
- 61% of EU27 exports go to other EU27 countries (2018)
- UK accounts for less than 6% of EU27 exports
- In 2021, UK trade was £1.3 trillion with deficit of £29 billion:
- Exports £625 billion; imports £654 billion; trade £1,280 billion
- Surplus on services – £127 billion; deficit on goods – £156 billion
- Deficit with EU27 of £32 billion; surplus with non-EU of £3 billion
- New UK-EU trade agreement is inferior to EU membership
- Brexit trade barriers reduce UK-EU trade volumes and profitability
- New red tape means extra costs for UK government and business
- Small percentage drop in EU-related trade costs UK £ billions. In 2019:
- 47% of UK trade was with EU (exports £301 billion, imports £372 billion)
- UK aimed to replace existing EU agreements with 70 countries before end of transition. At 1 January 2021:
- 64 of the 70 had been replaced, accounting for £221.2 billion or 15.6% of UK trade
- UK had signed Mutual Recognition Agreements with US, Australia and New Zealand
Investment
- COVID-19 caused a dramatic fall in world business investment and FDI in 2020
- 2021 saw a marked recovery in many countries, but not in UK
- UK business investment has not yet returned to pre-pandemic or pre-Brexit levels
- UK has been an attractive destination for FDI:
- In 2021, UK ranked 4th globally for FDI stock and 13th for FDI inflows
- UK’s stock of inward FDI comes mainly from its top trading partners – EU27 and US
- 2021 was the fifth successive year of falls in inward FDI to the UK
- Freeports provide limited benefits, but government intends to create ten
E Impact on economy
- Trade plays a critical role in the economy
- UK economy will grow more slowly with Brexit than without
- 80% of UK economy is devoted to services; 10% is devoted to manufacturing
- Manufacturing accounts for over 50% of UK exports – so critical for trade
- UK economy has recovered to pre-pandemic levels but is expected to lag G7 in 2023
- Since referendum, £ has weakened against $ and €, causing inflation to rise but helping exporters
- Brexit trade impacts mean UK trade has not recovered as well as other OECD countries
- OBR sees economic impacts of Brexit as
- Reduced GDP of 4%, mainly due to the effect non-tariff barriers with the EU
- Exports and imports will be around 15% lower in the long run than if UK had remained in EU
- Trade deals with non-EU countries will have an immaterial impact
- Long-run impact of £90 billion lost GDP (based on 4% of 2018 GDP)
- UK has high employment but low productivity relative to other advanced economies
- Real wage levels declined between 2008 and 2015 but started to grow in 2018
- In 2022, real wages are falling as inflation rises
F EU-UK trade agreement (TCA)
- UK left EU on 31 December 2020
- UK-EU TCA agreed 24 December 2020
- From 1 January 2021, TCA applied provisionally – came into force 1 May 2021
- Tariff-free, quota-free UK-EU trade
- Not all GB goods exports to EU are tariff-free
- TCA creates many new trade barriers for goods and services
- Controls on food, other animal and plant imports from EU still to be introduced
- Exclusion from EU programmes (eg Erasmus, Horizon) is major disadvantage
- Windsor Framework refines operation of Northern Ireland Protocol
- First five-year review of the implementation of the TCA in 2026
- Economic benefits from refinement will be small
- UK Trade and Business Commission ‘Blueprint for Policymakers’
- 114 recommendations to improve trade relationship
- Evidence-based
- Major economic benefits come from rejoining Single Market and Customs Union
G Impact on industry sectors and regions
Â
- Several studies (including government’s own analysis) conclude that all UK regions and nearly all industry sectors will be harmed by Brexit
- Economic impact on some industries (such as automotive and chemicals) is severe
- Public services, like health and social care, are badly affected because of reliance on EU workers
- Brexit trade barriers on UK exports create opportunities for EU suppliers to freeze out UK from EU opportunities
- 5 sectors expected to bear most of the trade costs:
- Financial services
- Automotive
- Agriculture, food and drink
- Consumer goods
- Chemicals and plastics
- 3Â sectors have the most jobs at risk:
- Administration and support services
- Wholesale trade
- Legal and accounting services
- Regions:
- Least affected: London and South East
- Most at risk: Cumbria, Hampshire, Herefordshire, Gloucestershire, Lancashire, Leicestershire, East Riding/North Lincolnshire, Warwickshire and Wiltshire
- High EU exports in vulnerable goods sectors:
- Northern Ireland and Cornwall (food, live animals and manufactures)
- Northumberland, Tees Valley and Durham (chemicals, machinery and transport equipment)
- East Wales (manufactures, machinery and transport equipment)
H Impact on policy areas
Â
- Policy areas such as science, education and healthcare face common harms from Brexit
- Harms include lost funding; lost influence over EU standards; lost participation in EU & international programmes; lost/reduced access to talent
- After Brexit, in areas like environment, defence and security, an ongoing partnership and continued cooperation between UK and EU27 remains important for UK’s future success
- After Brexit, challenge for UK is to find the will and effective ways to maintain UK involvement and influence on EU27
I UK-EU negotiations
- Phase 1 prioritised Withdrawal Agreement: principally citizens’ rights, Irish border and financial settlement.
- UK and EU signed legally binding WA on 24 January 2020
- Phase 2 focused on future UK-EU relationship
- Political Declaration published 14 November 2019 provided principles
- Detailed negotiations took place during transition to 31 December 2020
- Commons rejected WA three times 15 January to 29 March 2019
- On 11 April 2029, EU and UK agreed second Art50 extension to 31 October to ratify WA
- Subsequent 2019 events:
- 23 May, UK participated in EU elections
- 24 July, Boris Johnson became PM
- 28 August, Parliament prorogued from 10 September to 14 October
- 24 September, Supreme Court ruled prorogation unlawful & void.
- 2 October, UK Government proposed changes to WA but these were not seen as workable
- 17 October, UK agreed a revised WA/PD with EU
- 19 October, Parliamentary approval withheld until WA Act passed
- 19 October, UK requested extension to 31 January 2019
- 22 October, Commons approved second reading of WA Act but rejected short timetable for scrutiny
- 22 October, Government put WA Act into limbo
- 28 October, EU agreed a third Art50 extension to 31 January 2020
- 6 November, Parliament dissolved for General Election
- 12 December, Conservatives won large parliamentary majority
- 24 January 2020, Brexit Withdrawal Agreement signed
- 31 January 2020, UK left EU:
- Article 50 period ended
- Transition period began
- Transition lasted to 31 December 2020 (but could have been extended)
- EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement agreed 24 December 2020
- From 1 January 2021, TCA applied provisionally and came into force 1 May 2021
- Â
J 2020 negotiations
- UK in transition period until 31 December 2020
- Little time available for negotiation in 2020: around nine months
- One-time opportunity for extension before 1 July 2020
- EU was open to an extension but UK did not ask for one, despite COVID-19:
- Impeding negotiations
- Causing severe economic recession
- Future UK-EU partnership’s key elements:
- Economic partnership
- Security partnership
- General (programmes, equivalence, adequacy etc.)
- Commission negotiating scope, agreed by European Council, covered:
- Future relationship with the UK
- Implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement
- No-deal preparations
- Expired on 31 December 2020
- UK government stated aims were:
- Zero tariffs and quotas on UK-EU goods trade
- Ability to diverge from EU regulations and rules
- But:
- EU pre-condition for FTA was UK commitment to level playing field provisions
- UK’s choice to diverge has definite large costs and uncertain small benefits
- UK was almost certainly unable to implement Northern Ireland Protocol by December 2020:
- Practical and political disruption in NI
- UK could be taken to ECJ
- Brexit discussions did not finish on 31 December 2020
- Implementation activities will continue in 2021 and probably beyond
- Basic FTA had several advantages over ‘no deal’
K 'No deal'
- ‘No deal’ would have meant no UK-EU agreement beyond the Withdrawal Agreement
- Government found impact of ‘no deal’ would have been significant (even without effects of Covid-19)
- Yellowhammer planning assumptions
- UK and EU trade with tariffs on exports to EU and imports to UK (the main differences of ‘no deal’ with the TCA)
- As with TCA, ‘no deal’ would have meant a major increase in non-tariff barriers to EU-UK trade:
- No bilateral UK-EU agreements e.g. fisheries, agriculture
- EU imposes its standard ‘third-country’ tariffs on UK goods exports to EU
- EU does not grant UK regulatory equivalence for financial services nor adequacy for data
- New border procedures and regulatory certification for UK exports to EU: confusion and queues at borders
- New non-tariff barriers damage UK-EU services trade
- Price rises and shortages in shops: notably food
- UK citizens lose rights to freedom of movement in EEA: work, education, travel
- UK benefits from ‘rolled-over’ trade agreements with other countries
- Immediate and long-run economic damage for UK on top of Covid-19 effects
- Long-run cost to GDP estimated at 6% (TCA costs 4%)
- No agreement on the future UK-EU partnership in critical policy areas
- Defence and security: no basis for future UK participation with EU27 systems and agencies critical for UKÂ security
- Science and education:
- Loss of Horizon 2020 and Erasmus participation
- Reduced opportunities and mobility of talent
- Reduced participation in international science programmes, loss of funding etc.
- Longer-term, ‘no deal’ would have meant:
- Years of post-Brexit negotiations with EU and others
- Worst long-term economic impact of all Brexit options
- UK negotiating position would have been weak
Brexit FactBase
Summary
As at 21 August 2022
A EU and sovereignty
- EU’s origins come from the aftermath of WW2 – unifying ideal: a peaceful, united and prosperous Europe
- Single Market is unique globally in creating near-frictionless trade in goods and services between member states
- Four freedoms established in 1958
- When UK joined in 1973, it was clear that membership involved much more than trade
- Member states are sovereign nations who benefit from close cooperation
- UK was sovereign throughout its EU membership
- UK had a strong influence in the EU and on EU law
- Majority of UK law determined by UK – not by EU
- EU has areas to address but democratic deficit often exaggerated
- EU uses a democratic model to govern European Commission and approve laws
- In 2014, a UK government review identified areas for EU to improve (eg democratic accountability and application of subsidiarity)
- EU has its own reform agenda including better regulation, eurozone and further reform of CAP
- UK came before ECJ less frequently than most member states
- UK was subject to EU law during the transition period
B UK contribution and benefit
- UK net contribution was about 0.4% of GDP and less than 1.2% of public expenditure in 2019
- For 2019, UK contribution was:
- £14.4 billion gross after rebate
- £7.9 billion net after public/private sector receipts
- £152 million a week (or 32p per person per day)
- Economic benefits of EU membership add an estimated 4% to GDP (IFS):
- About ten times UK’s net contribution to EU
- In 2019, GDP was £2.3 trillion and EU membership was worth:
- ~£90 billion
- ~£1,700 million a week
- ~£450 per person for the year
- UK financial settlement (what UK owes EU) was about £34 billion at 31 December 2020:
- Includes £10.1 billion contributions for 2020
- From 2021 onwards, UK will pay EU for ongoing participation in EU programmes (e.g. Horizon)
C Immigration
- Government wishes to reduce immigration, but UK’s ageing population means UK needs more migrant workers not fewer
- Policy initiatives to reduce migrant workers (e.g. increasing retirement age)Â will take years to be effective
- Freedom of Movement rules include controls over EU citizens, but UK decided not to implement them
- Net migration from non-EU countries has significantly exceeded that from EU (by four to one over the last decade)
- EU migration benefits UK economy overall
- EU27 citizens of working age are more likely working than UK or non-EU citizens
- EEA citizens in 2016-17 contributed ~£5 billion to UK public finances
- Effects of EEA migration on UK wages and employment are small
- Reduced EU migration to UK damages economy and public services
- Brexit has caused:
- Fewer EU/EEA citizens to arrive and more to leave
- Rising net migration from non-EU/EEA countries
D Trade and investment
Trade
- About 3/4 of global trade is in goods and 1/4 is in services
- EU, US and China dominate world trade
- Services trade is growing faster than goods trade
- Goods trade growth is mainly between developing nations (South–South)
- Recent trends in world trade:
- In 2020, Covid-19 caused sharp fall in global trade
- In 2021, trade in goods rebounded strongly ahead of 2019 levels but services lagged behind
- In 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine disrupted trade again
- UK ranks:
- 7th for trade after Germany, Japan and France
- 10th for goods exports
- 2nd for services exports
- Tariff and non-tariff trade barriers impede trade
- Non-tariff barriers (such as rules of origin) have much bigger impact than tariffs
- UK’s red lines limited post-Brexit deal with EU to a basic FTA
- UK-EU FTA removed tariffs but raised non-tariff barriers
- Most EU trade is with other EU27 countries
- 61% of EU27 exports go to other EU27 countries (2018)
- UK accounts for less than 6% of EU27 exports
- In 2021, UK trade was £1.3 trillion with deficit of £29 billion:
- Exports £625 billion; imports £654 billion; trade £1,280 billion
- Surplus on services – £127 billion; deficit on goods – £156 billion
- Deficit with EU27 of £32 billion; surplus with non-EU of £3 billion
- New UK-EU trade agreement is inferior to EU membership
- Brexit trade barriers reduce UK-EU trade volumes and profitability
- New red tape means extra costs for UK government and business
- Small percentage drop in EU-related trade costs UK £ billions. In 2019:
- 47% of UK trade was with EU (exports £301 billion, imports £372 billion)
- UK aimed to replace existing EU agreements with 70 countries before end of transition. At 1 January 2021:
- 64 of the 70 had been replaced, accounting for £221.2 billion or 15.6% of UK trade
- UK had signed Mutual Recognition Agreements with US, Australia and New Zealand
Investment
- COVID-19 caused a dramatic fall in world business investment and FDI in 2020
- 2021 saw a marked recovery in many countries, but not in UK
- UK business investment has not yet returned to pre-pandemic or pre-Brexit levels
- UK has been an attractive destination for FDI:
- In 2021, UK ranked 4th globally for FDI stock and 13th for FDI inflows
- UK’s stock of inward FDI comes mainly from its top trading partners – EU27 and US
- 2021 was the fifth successive year of falls in inward FDI to the UK
- Freeports provide limited benefits, but government intends to create ten
E Impact on economy
- Trade plays a critical role in the economy
- UK economy will grow more slowly with Brexit than without
- 80% of UK economy is devoted to services; 10% is devoted to manufacturing
- Manufacturing accounts for over 50% of UK exports – so critical for trade
- UK economy has recovered to pre-pandemic levels but is expected to lag G7 in 2023
- Since referendum, £ has weakened against $ and €, causing inflation to rise but helping exporters
- Brexit trade impacts mean UK trade has not recovered as well as other OECD countries
- OBR sees economic impacts of Brexit as
- Reduced GDP of 4%, mainly due to the effect non-tariff barriers with the EU
- Exports and imports will be around 15% lower in the long run than if UK had remained in EU
- Trade deals with non-EU countries will have an immaterial impact
- Long-run impact of £90 billion lost GDP (based on 4% of 2018 GDP)
- UK has high employment but low productivity relative to other advanced economies
- Real wage levels declined between 2008 and 2015 but started to grow in 2018
- In 2022, real wages are falling as inflation rises
F EU-UK trade agreement (TCA)
- UK left EU on 31 December 2020
- UK-EU TCA agreed 24 December 2020
- From 1 January 2021, TCA applied provisionally – came into force 1 May 2021
- Tariff-free, quota-free UK-EU trade
- Not all GB goods exports to EU are tariff-free
- TCA creates many new trade barriers for goods and services
- Controls on food, other animal and plant imports from EU still to be introduced
- Exclusion from EU programmes (eg Erasmus, Horizon) is major disadvantage
- Windsor Framework refines operation of Northern Ireland Protocol
- First five-year review of the implementation of the TCA in 2026
- Economic benefits from refinement will be small
- UK Trade and Business Commission ‘Blueprint for Policymakers’
- 114 recommendations to improve trade relationship
- Evidence-based
- Major economic benefits come from rejoining Single Market and Customs Union
G Impact on industry sectors and regions
Â
- Several studies (including government’s own analysis) conclude that all UK regions and nearly all industry sectors will be harmed by Brexit
- Economic impact on some industries (such as automotive and chemicals) is severe
- Public services, like health and social care, are badly affected because of reliance on EU workers
- Brexit trade barriers on UK exports create opportunities for EU suppliers to freeze out UK from EU opportunities
- 5 sectors expected to bear most of the trade costs:
- Financial services
- Automotive
- Agriculture, food and drink
- Consumer goods
- Chemicals and plastics
- 3Â sectors have the most jobs at risk:
- Administration and support services
- Wholesale trade
- Legal and accounting services
- Regions:
- Least affected: London and South East
- Most at risk: Cumbria, Hampshire, Herefordshire, Gloucestershire, Lancashire, Leicestershire, East Riding/North Lincolnshire, Warwickshire and Wiltshire
- High EU exports in vulnerable goods sectors:
- Northern Ireland and Cornwall (food, live animals and manufactures)
- Northumberland, Tees Valley and Durham (chemicals, machinery and transport equipment)
- East Wales (manufactures, machinery and transport equipment)
H Impact on policy areas
Â
- Policy areas such as science, education and healthcare face common harms from Brexit
- Harms include lost funding; lost influence over EU standards; lost participation in EU & international programmes; lost/reduced access to talent
- After Brexit, in areas like environment, defence and security, an ongoing partnership and continued cooperation between UK and EU27 remains important for UK’s future success
- After Brexit, challenge for UK is to find the will and effective ways to maintain UK involvement and influence on EU27
I UK-EU negotiations
- Phase 1 prioritised Withdrawal Agreement: principally citizens’ rights, Irish border and financial settlement.
- UK and EU signed legally binding WA on 24 January 2020
- Phase 2 focused on future UK-EU relationship
- Political Declaration published 14 November 2019 provided principles
- Detailed negotiations took place during transition to 31 December 2020
- Commons rejected WA three times 15 January to 29 March 2019
- On 11 April 2029, EU and UK agreed second Art50 extension to 31 October to ratify WA
- Subsequent 2019 events:
- 23 May, UK participated in EU elections
- 24 July, Boris Johnson became PM
- 28 August, Parliament prorogued from 10 September to 14 October
- 24 September, Supreme Court ruled prorogation unlawful & void.
- 2 October, UK Government proposed changes to WA but these were not seen as workable
- 17 October, UK agreed a revised WA/PD with EU
- 19 October, Parliamentary approval withheld until WA Act passed
- 19 October, UK requested extension to 31 January 2019
- 22 October, Commons approved second reading of WA Act but rejected short timetable for scrutiny
- 22 October, Government put WA Act into limbo
- 28 October, EU agreed a third Art50 extension to 31 January 2020
- 6 November, Parliament dissolved for General Election
- 12 December, Conservatives won large parliamentary majority
- 24 January 2020, Brexit Withdrawal Agreement signed
- 31 January 2020, UK left EU:
- Article 50 period ended
- Transition period began
- Transition lasted to 31 December 2020 (but could have been extended)
- EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement agreed 24 December 2020
- From 1 January 2021, TCA applied provisionally and came into force 1 May 2021
- Â
J 2020 negotiations
- UK in transition period until 31 December 2020
- Little time available for negotiation in 2020: around nine months
- One-time opportunity for extension before 1 July 2020
- EU was open to an extension but UK did not ask for one, despite COVID-19:
- Impeding negotiations
- Causing severe economic recession
- Future UK-EU partnership’s key elements:
- Economic partnership
- Security partnership
- General (programmes, equivalence, adequacy etc.)
- Commission negotiating scope, agreed by European Council, covered:
- Future relationship with the UK
- Implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement
- No-deal preparations
- Expired on 31 December 2020
- UK government stated aims were:
- Zero tariffs and quotas on UK-EU goods trade
- Ability to diverge from EU regulations and rules
- But:
- EU pre-condition for FTA was UK commitment to level playing field provisions
- UK’s choice to diverge has definite large costs and uncertain small benefits
- UK was almost certainly unable to implement Northern Ireland Protocol by December 2020:
- Practical and political disruption in NI
- UK could be taken to ECJ
- Brexit discussions did not finish on 31 December 2020
- Implementation activities will continue in 2021 and probably beyond
- Basic FTA had several advantages over ‘no deal’
K 'No deal'
- ‘No deal’ would have meant no UK-EU agreement beyond the Withdrawal Agreement
- Government found impact of ‘no deal’ would have been significant (even without effects of Covid-19)
- Yellowhammer planning assumptions
- UK and EU trade with tariffs on exports to EU and imports to UK (the main differences of ‘no deal’ with the TCA)
- As with TCA, ‘no deal’ would have meant a major increase in non-tariff barriers to EU-UK trade:
- No bilateral UK-EU agreements e.g. fisheries, agriculture
- EU imposes its standard ‘third-country’ tariffs on UK goods exports to EU
- EU does not grant UK regulatory equivalence for financial services nor adequacy for data
- New border procedures and regulatory certification for UK exports to EU: confusion and queues at borders
- New non-tariff barriers damage UK-EU services trade
- Price rises and shortages in shops: notably food
- UK citizens lose rights to freedom of movement in EEA: work, education, travel
- UK benefits from ‘rolled-over’ trade agreements with other countries
- Immediate and long-run economic damage for UK on top of Covid-19 effects
- Long-run cost to GDP estimated at 6% (TCA costs 4%)
- No agreement on the future UK-EU partnership in critical policy areas
- Defence and security: no basis for future UK participation with EU27 systems and agencies critical for UKÂ security
- Science and education:
- Loss of Horizon 2020 and Erasmus participation
- Reduced opportunities and mobility of talent
- Reduced participation in international science programmes, loss of funding etc.
- Longer-term, ‘no deal’ would have meant:
- Years of post-Brexit negotiations with EU and others
- Worst long-term economic impact of all Brexit options
- UK negotiating position would have been weak